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ABSTRACT
Data fragmentation and dispersal over multiple clouds is a
way of data protection against honest-but-curious storage or
service providers. In this paper, we introduce a novel algo-
rithm for data fragmentation that is particularly well adapted
to be used in a multi-cloud environment. An empirical se-
curity analysis was performed on data sets provided by a
large enterprise and shows that the scheme achieves good
data protection. A performance comparison with published
related works demonstrates it can be more than twice faster
than the fastest of the relevant fragmentation techniques,
while producing reasonable storage overhead.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Data protection inside cloud-based storage systems is quite a
challenge. Data breaches happen on a daily basis, in extreme
cases leading to massive disclosure of sensitive data 1. A
user uploading his data to the cloud has to trust that the
provider will be able to protect the data not only from exterior
attackers, but also from insider threats like malicious system
administrators or implementation issues. Moreover, a user
will have to accept the fact that in some situations the cloud
provider will not disclose neither in which country his data
have been stored nor if this data have been revealed to
a foreign administration or third party. Encrypting data
before uploading them to the cloud seems to be a solution
to the problem. However, it requires that the user will take
care of the key management. A different approach consist in
fragmenting data and dispersing them over multiple clouds in
a way that no single cloud get enough information to recover
the data.
Data protection by means of fragmentation is not a new
idea. Since the early 90’ it appears in various proposals of
architectures for distributed storage [12]. The development of
the cloud technology reinforced the interest in this method-
ology, as it allows a broad dispersal of data over multiple
servers on different sites. Several authors already proposed to
use not one but two or more independent storage providers
to increase protection or availability of the data. Some of
the solutions fragments data along their structure in order
to break the dependencies [1, 11], while the rest apply differ-
ent fragmentation techniques from data shredding to perfect
1https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-09-29/the-
equifax-hack-has-all-the-hallmarks-of-state-sponsored-pros
or computational secret sharing [2, 4, 7, 18]. The choice of
the right fragmentation technique depends on the use case,
as it is usually a compromise between the desired level of
data protection, the produced storage overhead, and the frag-
mentation performance. In this paper we introduce a novel
fragmentation algorithm adapted for the use in a multi-cloud
environment. It fills the need for a fast keyless fragmenta-
tion method, that would provide a good level of protection
without a drastic increase in storage.
We consider a user who wants to keep his data confidential,
but he wants the solution to be fast, scalable, and inexpensive.
To comply with this last requirement, he will at least partially
outsource his data to a public environment such as a cloud.
Then, one of his problems regarding privacy becomes to
efficiently protect his data from the curiosity of the provider.
We propose to address this issue by fragmenting the user’s
data, encoding them, and dispersing fragments over several
non-colluding sites.
A new scheme situated between computational secret shar-
ing and information dispersal algorithms was sketched out
in our short three pages poster [13]. It has a limited domain
of application, because of its lack of scalability (performance
strongly depends on the desired number of fragments) and
a level of data protection that could be easily improved. In
this paper, we present a thoroughly revisited version of this
scheme that deals with scalability and security issues.
This paper is organized as follows. After rapidly describing
our motivations and our contribution in Section 2, as well as
relevant works in Section 3, we detail our algorithm and its
data model (Section 4 and 5).Then we analyze it in terms of
security (Section 6 and Section 7), as well as complexity and
memory occupation (Section 8). Last but no least, we bench-
mark it against the state-of-the-art techniques in Section 9.
An insight into future works ends up the paper.
2 CONTRIBUTION AND MOTIVATIONS
During the description of the proposed fragmentation method,
as well as during the presentation of the relevant works, the
following notations will be used:
- 𝑑: initial data of size |𝑑|
- 𝑓 : a data fragment of size |𝑓 | coming from the fragmenta-
tion of 𝑑
- 𝑐: the number of separated locations i.e. non-colluding
cloud providers
- 𝑘: the minimum number of fragments required for data
recovery; 𝑘 is known in the literature as a threshold
- 𝑛: the total number of fragments (including fragments
added for availability)
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The proposed algorithm fragments initial data 𝑑 into 𝑘
fragments 𝑓0, ..., 𝑓𝑘−1 that will be dispersed and stored over
𝑐 non-colluding clouds. Data recovery is therefore not possi-
ble unless all 𝑘 fragments are gathered. More precisely, the
fragmentation process uses a combination of secret sharing
and data permuting to create dependencies between data
inside the fragments. Such 𝑘 fragments are then dispersed
over 𝑐 clouds. The dispersal follows special rules ensuring
that the fragments stored at one provider do not reveal the
content of the initial data 𝑑. Additional 𝑛−𝑘 fragments could
be generated. However, we assume that in most cases there is
no need for that, as the cloud providers already apply their
own methods, i.e. replication, to ensure data availability. The
proposed fragmentation method achieves better performance
than the state-of-the art techniques, while generating a rea-
sonable memory overhead, and providing a good level of data
protection.
A typical use case for the application of the scheme is
the situation when a user would like to upload his data to a
public cloud storage service, but does not completely trust
the cloud provider. Therefore, he prefers to disperse his data
between two or three clouds in a way that any of cloud does
not get enough information about the data to recover them.
In the proposed threat model, we consider that a single
cloud provider is honest-but-curious: he will try to look at
the data he was entrusted with, but will not make the effort
to contact the 𝑐− 1 other cloud providers (who are supposed
to be unknown to him) in an attempt to recover the data. A
cloud site may also be vulnerable to exterior attacks leading to
a data leakage. In such a situation, the goal of the algorithm
is to fragment the data between the clouds in a way that the
fragments received by a single cloud are practically useless.
Another assumption in our use case, is that in a situation
where the choice of an appropriate fragmentation method
is a compromise between performance, memory overhead,
and data protection the user favors the performance. Indeed,
if the data are very sensitive or even critical, additional
protection method could be applied, like perfect secret sharing
or symmetric encryption (obviously this would decrease the
performance of the solution). In such a case, some fragments
could be stored in a private and trusted site, leading to an
increasing of storage costs.
3 RELATED WORKS TO DATA
FRAGMENTATION
We selected four relevant works from the domain since they
are widely used by both researchers and engineers. Two of
them are precise algorithm descriptions (Shamir’s secret shar-
ing and Information Dispersal Algorithm), while the other two
(Secret Sharing Made Short and AONT-RS) are rather flexible
fragmentation methods where one cryptographic mechanism
can be replaced by another one. Later in this paper, we will
present comparisons of these algorithms together with our
own proposition in terms of security, as well as in term of
memory occupation and performance. A more complete state
of the art can be found in [12] showing that these techniques
had a vast impact and have been successfully transfered in
the industry.
3.1 Shamir’s secret sharing (SSS)
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [28] takes as input data 𝑑 of
size |𝑑| and fragments them into 𝑛 fragments 𝑓0, ..., 𝑓𝑛−1 of
size |𝑑| each, that will be later distributed by a dealer to 𝑛
different players. Any 𝑘 of these fragments are needed for
the recovery of 𝑑. The algorithm is based on the fact that
given 𝑘 unequal points 𝑥0, ..., 𝑥𝑘−1 and 𝑘 arbitrary values
𝑦0, ..., 𝑦𝑘−1 there is at most one polynomial 𝑝 of degree less
or equal to 𝑘− 1 such that 𝑝
(︀
𝑥𝑖
)︀
= 𝑦𝑖, 𝑖 = 0, ..., 𝑘 − 1. In SSS
data are transformed into 𝑛 points 𝑓0 =
(︀
𝑥0, 𝑦0
)︀
, ..., 𝑓𝑛−1 =(︀
𝑥𝑛−1, 𝑦𝑛−1
)︀
belonging to a random polynomial. The scheme
provides information-theoretic security, but has quadratic
complexity in function of 𝑘 and leads to a n-fold increase of
storage space. It is usually applied for protection of small or
critical data like encryption keys. In such a use case, draw-
backs of the scheme are acceptable or negligible, but for larger
data they become a major stumbling block. In [20], a space
efficient secret sharing scheme was presented that modifies
the Shamir’s scheme in order to save memory occupation.
Shamir’s scheme does not protect against a malicious dealer
that would like to modify the data fragments. A verifiable
secret sharing scheme in which the players can verify if their
fragments are consistent, was introduced in [27].
3.2 Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA)
Rabin’s Information Dispersal Algorithm [22] divides data
𝑑 of size |𝑑| into 𝑛 fragments of size |𝑑|𝑘 each, so that any 𝑘
fragments suffice for reconstruction. More precisely, the 𝑛
data fragments are obtained by multiplying the initial data
by a 𝑘 × 𝑛 nonsingular generator matrix. The 𝑛 rows of the
matrix are dispersed within the data fragments. Recovery
consists in multiplying any 𝑘 fragments by the inverse of
a 𝑘 × 𝑘 matrix built from 𝑘 rows of the generator matrix
received within the 𝑘 fragments. An IDA adds redundancy to
data and produces a negligible storage overhead. It provides
some data protection, as the input data cannot be explicitly
reconstructed from fewer than the 𝑘 required fragments [16].
However, even if it is not possible to directly recover the
data, some information about the content of the initial data
is leaked. Indeed, data patterns are preserved inside the
fragments when the same matrix is reused to encode different
data. A similar problem occurs while using the Electronic
Code Book block cipher mode for block cipher symmetric
encryption [9]. Even with this weakness, it is still being
considered as one the techniques that could be potentially
useful in a multi-cloud environment [4].
3.3 Secret Sharing Made Short (SSMS)
Krawczyk’s Secret Sharing Made Short [15] combines sym-
metric encryption with perfect secret sharing and introduces
a secret sharing adapted for protection of larger data. In
this method, data 𝑑 are first encrypted using a symmetric
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encryption algorithm, then fragmented using an Information
Dispersal Algorithm. The encryption key is fragmented us-
ing a perfect secret sharing scheme (like SSS) and dispersed
within data fragments. In consequence, the solution does
not require explicit key management. The storage overhead
does not depend on data size |𝑑|, but is equal to the size of
the key per data fragment. The performance of the SSMS
technique depends on the details of the chosen techniques for
encryption and data dispersal.
3.4 AONT-RS
Similarly to SSMS, the AONT-RS method [6, 24] combines
symmetric encryption with data dispersal. The difference
between the two methods lies in the key management. Inside
AONT-RS data 𝑑 are first encrypted using a symmetric key
algorithm and then the key used for encryption is XOR-ed
with the hash of the encrypted data. Such processed data
are then fragmented into 𝑘 fragments and 𝑛− 𝑘 fragments
are added using a systematic Reed-Solomon error correction
code [23] (which may be seen as an IDA). The performance
of the AONT-RS technique depends on the details of the
chosen techniques for encryption, data hashing, and the Reed-
Solomon implementation. A CAONT-RS method is similar
to the AONT-RS, except that the key used to encrypt the
data is not random, but generated from the hash of the input
data [17, 18].
The AONT-RS took inspiration from the all-or-nothing
transform (AONT) introduced by Rivest [25]. An AONT is
a preprocessing step applied before encryption, that makes
impossible to recover the input data unless possessing the
entire ciphertext. Input data are seen as a sequence of mes-
sages, that are encrypted with a random key and then the
key is XOR-ed with the hashes of the messages. The cost of
an AONT proposed by Rivest is approximately twice the cost
of the actual encryption, in contrary to AONT-RS where the
encryption is applied only once.
4 DATA CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS, AND
PREREQUISITES
This Section introduces few data concepts and definitions
that may help the understanding of the description of the
fragmentation algorithm. We also point out few prerequisites
necessary for an optimal execution of the fragmentation.
4.1 Data concepts
Our approach utilizes the following key data components
with their size in number of bits and their dimensions in
terms of number of blocks (and for a block or a share in
terms of mini-blocks and mini-shares respectively):
∙ Mini-block (𝑚𝑏): a sequence of bits of size |𝑚𝑏|
∙ Data block or block (𝑏): a sequence of bits of size |𝑏| belong-
ing to the original input data and for ease of computation
will be a multiple of the size of a mini-block, therefore,
containing #𝑏 = |𝑏||𝑚𝑏| mini-blocks
∙ Data (𝑑): an input data of size |𝑑| bits composed of#𝑑 = |𝑑||𝑏|
data blocks; assuming that the size of 𝑑 is a multiple of the
size of a block (if ever that was not to be the case, some
padding technique could be applied)
∙ Mini-share (𝑚𝑠): a sequence of bits of size |𝑚𝑠| = |𝑚𝑏|
generated by the transformation of a mini-block
∙ Share (𝑠): a sequence of bits of size |𝑠| = |𝑏| bits, coming
from the transformation of a data block and containing
#𝑠 = #𝑏 mini-shares
∙ Permutation array (𝑝𝑎): an array of size |𝑝𝑎| bits containing
#𝑝𝑎 = #𝑏 values: all natural numbers in range 0, ...,#𝑏− 1
appearing in a random order
∙ Permutation share (𝑝𝑠): a share of size |𝑝𝑠| = |𝑝𝑎| bits
coming from a splitting of a permutation array 𝑝𝑎
∙ Fragment (𝑓): a fragment composed of #𝑓 = |𝑓 ||𝑏| =
#𝑑
𝑘
blocks at the beginning of the algorithm; then composed of
the same number #𝑓 of data shares plus one permutation
share at the end of the algorithm.
In the sequel, we will assume that 𝑑 and its size and 𝑐 the
number of independent storage sites are given by the use case
description and that the user will be choosing the threshold
𝑘 as a multiple of 𝑐 and that at the same time in order
to simplify the reading of this paper, the size of 𝑑 can be
considered as a multiple of the size of a mini-block verifying
the following equation: |𝑑| = 𝑘#𝑓#𝑏|𝑚𝑏|.
4.1.1 Notations. A fragment 𝑗 is denoted by 𝑓𝑗 . A block
𝑖 inside a fragment 𝑓𝑗 is denoted by 𝑏𝑗𝑖 . A share 𝑖 inside a
fragment 𝑓𝑗 generated through the transformation of the
block 𝑏𝑗𝑖 is denoted by 𝑠
𝑗
𝑖 . A permutation array 𝑝𝑎𝑟 is used
to permute mini-shares inside the fragment 𝑓𝑗 , where 𝑟 is
an integer in 0, ..., 𝑘𝑐 − 1 such that 𝑗 mod 𝑘𝑐 = 𝑟. A value at
the position 𝑡 inside a permutation array 𝑝𝑎𝑟 is denoted by
𝑝𝑎𝑟
(︀
𝑡
)︀
. A permutation share 𝑧 coming from the split of a
permutation array 𝑝𝑎𝑟 into 𝑐 permutation shares is denoted
by 𝑝𝑠𝑟,𝑧 , where 𝑧 is an integer in 0, ..., 𝑐 − 1 such that 𝑗
mod 𝑐 = 𝑧. A mini-block at the position 𝑣 inside a block 𝑏𝑗𝑖
is denoted by 𝑏𝑗𝑖
(︀
𝑣
)︀
, where 𝑣 is an integer in 0, ...,#𝑏− 1. A
mini-share generated from a mini-block 𝑏𝑗𝑖
(︀
𝑣
)︀
, at the position
𝑤 inside a share 𝑠𝑗𝑖 is denoted by 𝑠
𝑗
𝑖
(︀
𝑤
)︀
, where 𝑤 is an integer
in 0, ...,#𝑏− 1 such that 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑧
(︀
𝑣
)︀
= 𝑤.
4.2 Definitions
The core of our fragmentation process consists in encoding a
mini-block using already encoded mini-blocks (mini-shares),
constituting a new mini-share. Mini-share after mini-share,
shares are then constituted. Doing so is creating dependen-
cies between data at the level of mini-shares, of shares, and
ultimately of fragments. Such created dependencies are the
strongest only between groups of 𝑐 fragments that will be
called neighbors. On the one hand, these dependencies are
assuring that 𝑘 fragments are necessary to reconstruct mean-
ingful data. On another hand, they can be felt as a key
3
information to undertake cryptanalysis. To minimize the op-
portunity for an attacker to use them, neighbor fragments
will be systematically dispersed to different independent sites.
Shares and mini-shares contained in neighbor fragments and
used to generate a new share or mini-share from a block
or a mini-block will be called parent share or mini-share
along the definitions hereunder. All 𝑘 fragments are therefore
constructed share by share, row of shares after row of share.
By convention, a permutation share 𝑝𝑠𝑟,𝑧 will be consid-
ered as a share 𝑠𝑗0 with 𝑗 = 𝑟𝑐 + 𝑧. A share 𝑠
𝑗
𝑖 is the result
of encoding of the block 𝑏𝑗𝑖 using 𝑐 − 1 previously encoded
shares from 𝑐− 1 other fragments. The 𝑐− 1 shares used for
the encoding of 𝑠𝑗𝑖 are its parent shares and the fragments to
which they belong are the neighbor fragments of the fragment
𝑓𝑗 . Similarly, 𝑐− 1 mini-shares used to encode a mini-share
𝑠
𝑗
𝑖
(︀
𝑤
)︀
are called parent mini-shares and they belong to par-
ent shares of 𝑠𝑗𝑖 contained inside the neighbor fragments of 𝑓𝑗 .
Intuitively, dependencies between a share/mini-share and its
parents or between a fragment and its neighbor are stronger
than between the rest of the data. These dependencies could
be exploited by an attacker and have to be taken care of.
Later in this section, we describe how these relations will be
broken by dispersing concerned data over independent sites.
Definition 4.1. Parent shares A share 𝑠𝑗𝑖 belonging to a
fragment 𝑓𝑗 such that 𝑖 > 0 possesses 𝑐− 1 parent shares:
𝑠
𝑗+1 mod 𝑘
𝑖−1 , .., 𝑠
𝑗+𝑐−1 mod 𝑘
𝑖−1
Definition 4.2. Parent mini-shares A mini-share 𝑠𝑗𝑖
(︀
𝑤
)︀
belonging to the share 𝑠𝑗𝑖 , that was generated from the mini-
block at the position 𝑣 inside the block 𝑏𝑗𝑖 and such that
𝑖 > 0, possesses 𝑐 − 1 parent mini-shares inside the parent
shares of 𝑠𝑗𝑖 :
𝑠
𝑗+1 mod 𝑘
𝑖−1
(︀
𝑣
)︀
, .., 𝑠
𝑗+𝑐−1 mod 𝑘
𝑖−1
(︀
𝑣
)︀
Definition 4.3. Neighbor fragments A fragment 𝑓𝑗 from
the set of 𝑘 fragments 𝑓0, ..., 𝑓𝑘−1 possesses 𝑐− 1 neighbor
fragments:
𝑓𝑗+1 mod 𝑘, .., 𝑓𝑗+𝑐−1 mod 𝑘
4.3 Prerequisites
Size of data 𝑑 Data 𝑑 of size |𝑑| are composed of #𝑑 blocks
of data 𝑏1, ..., 𝑏#𝑑. Therefore, the size of the data is equal to
|𝑑| = |𝑏|×#𝑑. During fragmentation, the data are distributed
over 𝑘 fragments in a way that each of the fragments receives
a portion of data of size |𝑑|𝑘 . To ensure a balanced distribution,
the number of blocks inside the data #𝑑 has to be a multiple
of the number of fragments 𝑘. This can be achieved by the
use of padding.
Number of mini-block inside a block The chosen value #𝑏
of number of mini-blocks inside a block has an impact on the
size of the fragments. A permutation array has to contain
all the natural values from the range of 0, ...,#𝑏− 1. If the
number of mini-blocks inside a block #𝑏 is greater than the
maximum value that can be encoded on |𝑚𝑏| bits, the size
of permutation arrays is greater than the size of the blocks.
To simplify computations and minimize memory overhead,
the maximum size of the block should not greater than the
maximum value that can be represented on |𝑚𝑏| bits.
Values of k and c 𝑘 defines the number of fragments re-
quired for data recovery and 𝑐 represents the number of cloud
providers. Obviously, 𝑘 have to be greater than 𝑐. In order
to facilitate the computations, 𝑘 should be also a multiple of
𝑐. This comes from the fact that during the fragmentation
process 𝑘 shares are produced from 𝑐 permutation arrays
that have to be later dispersed over 𝑐 clouds.
5 CREATING AND DISPERSING
FRAGMENTS
Following subsections detail how our fragmentation algorithm
transforms data 𝑑 into 𝑘 fragments and how it disperses the
𝑘 fragments over 𝑐 clouds. The pseudo-code of the whole
procedure can be found in Figure 8. We do not describe
the defragmentation procedure as it is an inverse of the
fragmentation.
5.1 Data distribution over fragments
In a first step implemented inside the FormFragments
function, data 𝑑 are distributed over 𝑘 fragments 𝑓0, ..., 𝑓𝑘−1
in such a way that 𝑏𝑖 is assigned to 𝑓𝑗 ⇐⇒ 𝑖 mod 𝑘 = 𝑗.
Because the number of blocks is a multiple of 𝑘, each fragment
receives exactly |𝑑|𝑘 of the input data (see schema Figure 1).
This method of proceeding was chosen, as it allows to start the
encoding of first distributed data blocks before the whole data
are distributed over fragments in a pipelined manner. The
distribution of data over fragments could also be performed in
a simpler way: data could be just divided into 𝑘 consecutive
chunks of size |𝑑|𝑘 .
Figure 1: Distributing data blocks over 𝑘 = 4 initial data
fragments. Each fragment receives 14 of the data 𝑑. Any pair
of adjacent blocks are distributed in different fragments.
5.2 Generating permutations
Permutation arrays are used during data encoding, therefore
they have to be generated before the start of the encoding
procedure. GeneratePermutations function generates 𝑘𝑐
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random permutation arrays 𝑝𝑎0, ..., 𝑝𝑎 𝑘
𝑐−1 of length #𝑝𝑎 =
#𝑏 containing all natural numbers from the range 0, ...,#𝑝𝑎−
1 appearing in a random order.
The main role of a permutation array is to mix up positions
of mini-shares inside a freshly generated share. The encoding
creates dependencies between mini-shares from neighbors
fragments, so it is not possible to recover a mini-share inside
a fragment without possessing its parents mini-shares from
neighbor fragments. However, the proposed encoding is not a
complex operation, as its main goal is to be fast. An attacker
may try to guess the values of 𝑐− 1 missing mini-shares in
order to recover a single mini-block. The fact that he knows
that the order of the encoded mini-shares is the same as
the order of mini-blocks inside initial data may be helpful in
this attack attempt. Changing positions of mini-shares inside
a share slows down an attacker, as in addition to guessing
values from fragments that he does not possess he has to
obtain the right order of the encoded data. With a reasonably
long permutation array it becomes a significant obstacle on
the way to partial data recovery.
Permutation arrays are necessary for data recovery and
important for data protection, therefore they have to be
securely transmitted within the final 𝑘 data fragments. In
the proposed algorithm, they are fragmented using a perfect
secret sharing scheme into 𝑐 permutation shares each that
will be dispersed over 𝑐 cloud providers. In more details, the
function SplitPermutations implements a XOR-split that
splits permutation arrays into 𝑐 permutation shares each
(presented in Figure 2). The obtained 𝑘 (because 𝑘𝑐 × 𝑐 = 𝑘)
permutation shares are then distributed over 𝑘 fragments
in a way that 𝑝𝑠𝑟𝑧 is assigned to 𝑓𝑗 ⇐⇒ 𝑟 × 𝑐 + 𝑧 = 𝑗.
A permutation share 𝑝𝑠𝑟𝑧 becomes the first share 𝑠𝑗0 of a
fragment 𝑗. At the end, 𝑘 fragments containing in total 𝑘𝑐
sets of permutations shares will be dispersed over 𝑐 clouds.
This observation leads to the formulation of the Remark 1
on the secure dispersal of the fragments.
Remark 1 (Dispersing permutation shares). Frag-
ments that store one of the 𝑐 permutation shares belonging to
one single permutation array should be stored separately, i.e.
dispersed over different 𝑐 cloud providers.
Each permutation share plays a double role. It is not only
used to recover one of the permutation arrays, but as it is
the first share of a fragment, it is also used as a kind of
initialization block during data encoding.
5.3 Data encoding
After data dispersal described in Section 5.1, each fragment
contains a part of the input data that could potentially reveal
some information about the initial data content. Therefore,
data inside fragments have to be encoded. The goal of the en-
coding is to create relationships between neighbor fragments
at the level of shares and mini-shares, in a way that it is not
possible to recover any block or any mini-block of initial data
without gathering all of the 𝑘 fragments. To achieve this, each
block 𝑏𝑗𝑖 inside an fragment 𝑓𝑗 is encoded using 𝑐− 1 parent
Figure 2: Splitting 𝑘𝑐 permutation arrays into 𝑘 permutation
shares. Here, 𝑐 = 2 and 𝑘 = 4. As an example, the permutation
share 𝑝𝑠1,0 will be appended to the fragment 𝑓2.
shares from neighbor fragments of 𝑓𝑗 (illustrated in Figure
3). The processing is sequential and its philosophy could be
roughly compared to the CBC encryption mode: once a block
is encoded into a share it becomes a parent to the next block.
The first block of each of the fragments does not posses natu-
ral parents, as its the first block to be encoded into a share (a
similar problem occurs in CBC mode, where an initialization
vector is introduced as the first block). For the 𝑘 first blocks
permutation shares are used as parents. This solution has
two advantages. First, it allows to save storage space and
not to generate 𝑘 fresh initialization shares. Second, because
permutation shares are pseudo-random (they are the result
of a xor-split) they add some randomness to the encoding.
The processing is sequential and requires that all the 𝑘 frag-
ments are encoded at the same time. An encoding of a block
into a share consists in encoding each of its mini-block using
mini-shares from 𝑐− 1 parent shares. After a mini-share is
encoded, its position inside its block is permuted with the
help of one of the permutation arrays. A block with all its
mini-shares encoded becomes a share.
Figure 3: Encoding data blocks into data shares.
5.3.1 Encoding a block into a share. A block 𝑏𝑗𝑖 is trans-
formed into a corresponding share 𝑠𝑗𝑖 inside the function
EncodeBlock . Each of the mini-block inside a block will
be encoded in a Shamir’s like fashion as a point of a polyno-
mial of degree 𝑐− 1, where the coefficients of the polynomial
are picked from parent shares of the block.
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Before the start of the block encoding, parent shares
(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠) of the block are selected. Following the Defi-
nition 4.1, a share 𝑠𝑙𝑖−1, 𝑙 = 𝑗 + 1 mod 𝑘, . . . , 𝑗 + 𝑐− 1 mod 𝑘,
becomes a parent share of 𝑏𝑗𝑖 (function SelectParent-
Shares). Intuitively, parent shares are the last 𝑐− 1 shares
from the neighbors of the fragment that is being encoded (or
𝑐 − 1 permutation shares when the block to be encoded is
the first block of a fragment). Parent shares will be used for
selecting coefficients of the encoding polynomials. Moreover,
an evaluation point 𝑥 is selected that is an integer in range
of 2, ..., 2|𝑚𝑏|−1 (2|𝑚𝑏|−1 being the maximum value that can
be encoded on |𝑚𝑏| bits) (function PickX). 𝑥 will be the
point at which the encoding polynomials for mini-shares will
be evaluated. In addition, 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 takes also as input
the permutation array 𝑝𝑎𝑗 mod 𝑘𝑐 (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦) that will
be used for permuting mini-shares.
1: function EncodeBlock(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠,𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦,𝑥,𝑏𝑗𝑖 )
2: for 𝑣 = 0 : #𝑏− 1 do
3: 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑆=SelectParentMS
(︀
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
)︀
4: 𝑚𝑠= EncodeMiniBlock
(︁
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑆, 𝑥, 𝑏
𝑗
𝑖
(︀
𝑣
)︀)︁
5: 𝑠𝑗𝑖
(︀
𝑤
)︀
=PermuteMiniShare
(︀
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦
(︀
𝑣
)︀
,𝑚𝑠
)︀
Figure 4: Pseudo-code of the function EncodeBlock that trans-
forms a block 𝑏𝑗𝑖 into a share 𝑠
𝑗
𝑖 .
Once a set of parent shares and the evaluation point are se-
lected, the block is encoded mini-block by mini-block (pseudo-
code presented in Figure 4). For a mini-block 𝑏𝑗𝑖
(︀
𝑣
)︀
a set of
𝑐 − 1 parent mini-shares (𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑆) is selected from the
set of the parent shares (SelectParentMS). Following the
Definition 4.2, a mini-share 𝑠𝑗𝑖−1
(︀
𝑣
)︀
that is at the position 𝑣
inside a parent share becomes a parent mini-share. The mini-
block 𝑏𝑗𝑖
(︀
𝑣
)︀
is then transformed into a mini-share 𝑠𝑗𝑖
(︀
𝑤
)︀
inside the EncodeMiniBlock function. The position 𝑤 of
the mini-share is returned by the functionPermuteMini-
Share). The process of encoding a mini-block 𝑏𝑗𝑖
(︀
𝑣
)︀
into a
mini-share 𝑠𝑗𝑖
(︀
𝑤
)︀
is illustrated in Figure 5.
5.3.2 Encoding a mini-block into a mini-share. Encode-
MiniBlock function (see Figure 6) takes as input a mini-
block𝑚𝑏 to be encoded, 𝑐−1 parent mini-shares (𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑆),
and a value 𝑥.
The encoding procedure is based on Shamir’s scheme. A(︀
𝑐, 𝑐
)︀
threshold is applied . 𝑐 − 1 coefficients are used to
construct an encoding polynomial for a single secret (in
our case the mini-block to encode constitutes the secret)
are not pseudo-random, but they are taken from the set of
previously encoded mini-blocks. Such constructed polynomial
is evaluated at only one point 𝑥. Indeed, as the coefficients
of the polynomial are also mini-shares, to recover the an
encoded mini-block we need its corresponding mini-share
and its 𝑐− 1 parent mini-shares used as coefficients. Reusing
mini-shares lowers the security level, but prevents an increase
Figure 5: Encoding a mini-block into a mini-share.
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑀𝑆 are used as coefficients of the encoding poly-
nomial, 𝑥 is the point at which the polynomial is evaluated.
1: 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑆 = 𝑎0, 𝑎1, ..., 𝑎𝑐−2
2: function EncodeMiniBlock(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑆, 𝑥,𝑚𝑏)
3: return 𝑚𝑠 = 𝑚𝑏 + 𝑥𝑎0 + ... + 𝑥𝑐−1𝑎𝑐−2
Figure 6: Pseudo-code of the EncodeMiniBlock function pro-
ducing a mini-share value 𝑚𝑠.
in memory (discussed in Section 6). Intuitively, a mini-share
and its parent mini-shares should not end up inside the same
fragments and should be separated from each other. This
leads to the following dispersal remark:
Remark 2 (Dispersing mini-shares). A mini-share and
its 𝑐−1 parent mini-shares should be dispersed over 𝑐 different
locations (ideally 𝑐 cloud providers).
Figure 7: Fragments dispersal over 𝑐 = 2 clouds. Neighbors
are dispersed over different clouds.
5.4 Dispersing fragments over the clouds
Data encoding produces 𝑘 final fragments 𝑓0, ..., 𝑓𝑘−1. A
final fragment contains encoded data, as well as one permu-
tation share. Such final fragments are dispersed over 𝑐 clouds
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑0, ..., 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑𝑐−1 (illustrated in Figure 7). The dispersal
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1: function EncodeData(𝑑, 𝑐, 𝑘)
2: 𝑓0, ..., 𝑓𝑘−1=FormFragments
(︀
𝑘, 𝑑
)︀
◁ distributes data over 𝑘 fragments
3: 𝑝𝑎0, ..., 𝑝𝑎 𝑘
𝑐−1 =GeneratePermutations
(︀
𝑐, 𝑘,#𝑏
)︀
◁ generates 𝑘𝑐 permutation arrays
4: 𝑠00, . . . , 𝑠
𝑘−1
0 =SplitPermutations
(︁
𝑝𝑎0, ..., 𝑝𝑎 𝑘
𝑐−1
)︁
◁ splits and distributes permutation arrays
5: while all #𝑏𝑘 blocks of all 𝑘 fragments are processed do ◁ transforms data by sets of 𝑘 blocks
6: for each block 𝑏𝑗𝑖 of a fragment 𝑓𝑗 do
7: 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 =SelectParentShares
(︁
𝑏
𝑗
𝑖
)︁
◁ selects 𝑐− 1 previously generated shares
8: 𝑥=PickX
9: 𝑠𝑗𝑖=EncodeBlock
(︁
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝑝𝑎𝑗 mod 𝑘𝑐
, 𝑥, 𝑏
𝑗
𝑖
)︁
◁ transforms a block into a share
Figure 8: Pseudo-code of the function 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 that transform input data 𝑑 into a set of 𝑘 fragments.
procedure (pseudo-code in Figure 9) is defined by one rule:
two neighbor fragments cannot be stored at one single cloud
provider. The consequence of this rule is the requirement
for at least 𝑐 independent cloud providers. We recommend
a 𝑐 = 2 or 𝑐 = 3, as a larger number of clouds could lead
to latency issues. The total number of fragments 𝑘 is the
choice of the user: a higher value of 𝑘 could reinforce the
data protection inside the cloud against external attackers
(that would have to gather data fragments not only from
different clouds, but also multiple cloud servers). A weaker
variation of the dispersal algorithm where only one cloud is
used could be also considered: to mislead the cloud a user
can upload the data fragments from 𝑐 different accounts. In
the considered scenario, we assume that the user does not
have to care about data availability, as data availability is
usually guaranteed while signing the SLA. A user fearing
data loss can however generate 𝑛− 𝑘 additional fragments
and disperse them over an additional cloud.
1: function DisperseFragments(𝑓0, ..., 𝑓𝑗 , ..., 𝑓𝑘−1)
2: for 𝑖 = 0 : 𝑘 − 1 do
3: disperse fragment 𝑓𝑗 to the cloud 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑𝑗 mod 𝑐
Figure 9: Pseudo-code of the DisperseFragments function.
6 SECURITY EVALUATION
Each cloud receives 𝑘𝑐 non-neighbor fragments. A single
honest-but-curious cloud provider can try two things: to
decode a portion of data from received fragments or to ver-
ify if data inside received fragments match some presumed
data. He has to overcome a combination of three obstacles
to satisfy his curiosity: data dispersal, data permuting, and
data encoding.
6.1 Data dispersal
The first and simplest obstacle is data dispersal. A single
provider receives 𝑘 fragments containing only a portion of
encoded input data of size |𝑑|𝑐 in total. Even decoded, in-
formation contained inside the fragments is sampled (the
result of FormFragments) and incomplete. Moreover, if the
cloud does not receive any information about the ordering of
the fragments, it has to check
(︀
𝑘
𝑐
)︀
! possibilities of fragments
reassembling.
6.2 Breaking data permuting
A single cloud receives data fragments, which shares were
permuted using one or more permutation arrays. These per-
mutation arrays were split using a perfect secret sharing
scheme (𝑥𝑜𝑟-split) into 𝑐 permutation shares and each of
the cloud providers received only one of permutation shares
from the set corresponding to one permutation array. In
consequence, a single cloud cannot recover any permutation
array. The difficulty of a brute-force attack on a permutation
array will obviously depends on the length of the array. For
a permutation array of size #𝑏, #𝑏! possible permutations
exist. If the blocks are small, a brute-force attack is feasi-
ble. However, a #𝑏 = 34 results in 2.95× 1038 permutation
array possibilities, which is comparable to the number of
tries that are required to perform a brute-force attack on
a 128-bit symmetric encryption key (2128 gives 3.4 × 1038
possibilities). An increase of the size of the block slightly
affects the storage space, but also improves the performance
of the fragmentation process (see Section 9).
6.3 Breaking data encoding
Each mini-block of data inside a fragment is encoded using
parent mini-shares from neighbor fragments. The dispersal
procedure ensures that neighbor fragments (and therefore all
the mini-shares implicated in the encoding process) will never
end up being stored at the same storage provider. However,
parent mini-shares are not totally random, as they depend
on the data already encoded, as well as on 𝑐− 1 first pseudo-
random blocks. In order to break the data encoding, a cloud
can try to solve a system of polynomial equations: each mini-
share may be represented in function of its initial mini-block
and its parent mini-shares. Recursively, parent mini-shares
may be represented in the same way.
If the cloud has some assumptions about the stored data
or it would like to verify if its fragments may belong to
some predefined data, then its work will be slightly easier.
In the first scenario, the assumptions may add additional
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equations linking the data, but the fact that the encoded data
are permuted makes it hard to exploit those dependencies
(unless the permutation are being recovered). In the second
case, the cloud will only have to guess the missing part of
the 𝑘𝑐 pseudo-random first shares. With a reasonably large
block size |𝑏| it is a non-negligible impediment.
7 EMPIRICAL SECURITY EVALUATION
The proposed scheme aims at providing fast data fragmen-
tation that achieves a good data protection level. An ex-
perimental analysis of security characteristics of the scheme
based on the methodology presented in [19] was performed.
Tests were adapted to the fragmenting nature of the scheme.
Obtained results show that data inside the fragments achieve
a good level of uniformity and independence. In contrary to
an IDA, the scheme does not preserve patterns inside data
fragments.
All tests were performed using Matlab environment on
textual data samples provided by the French post office
LaPoste2. An example of one of such data sample is shown
in Figure 10a. Its corresponding fragment is presented in
Figure 10c and compared to the one obtained using an IDA
(Figure 10b).
(a) Original data (b) IDA (c) Proposed scheme
Figure 10: Byte value distribution of a textual data sample
(a) and distribution of one of its fragment after applying
an IDA (b), and after applying the proposed approach (c),
k=2. Data patterns are preserved after the use of an IDA.
Fragment (c) contains all possible byte values and does not
contain visible data patterns. x-axis shows the byte position
inside the sample, y-axis shows the byte value at position 𝑥.
Probability Density Function. Frequency counts close to a
uniform distribution testify data have a good level of mixing.
This means that each byte value inside a fragment should
have an occurrence probability close to 1𝑣 = 0.0039, where 𝑣
is the number of possible values (256 for a byte). In Figure 11,
the probability density function (PDF) of a data sample and
two of its fragments are shown. Results for the fragments
are spread over the space and have a distribution close to
uniform. It demonstrates that the occurrence probability of
byte values is close to 0.0039.
Entropy. Information entropy is a measure of unpredictability
of information content [5]. In a good fragmentation scheme
the entropy of the fragments should be close to ideal. Figure
12 shows entropy value for three different fragmented data
2http://www.laposte.fr/
Figure 11: Probability density function comparison for data
and their two different fragments. x-axis shows possible byte
values in the sample, the y-axis shows the probability of occur-
rence of a value. For fragmented data, the occurrence prob-
ability is close to the one of a uniform distribution (0.039).
samples for different fragmentation algorithm. The entropy
value of the fragments generated using our proposal was
comparable with the entropy of fragments generated using
SSMS and much higher than the one obtained using an IDA.
Figure 12: Entropy comparison for three data samples (text,
image). Maximum entropy value is equal to 8. Entropy of
fragments obtained using IDA depends strongly on the entropy
of the input data. Our scheme gives fragments with entropy
comparable to other techniques.
Chi-squared test. Uniformity of byte values of data inside
fragments was validated by applying a chi-squared test [8].
For a significance level of 0.05 the null hypothesis is not
rejected and the distribution of the fragment data is uniform
if 𝜒2𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 ≤ 𝜒2𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑦255, 0.05 ≈ 293. The test was applied
on fragmentation results of 15 different data samples for a
fragment size of 1000 bytes. For all samples the tests was
successful.
Recurrence. A recurrence plot serves to estimate correlation
inside data [26]. Considering data vector 𝑥 = 𝑥1, 𝑥2, ..., 𝑥𝑚 a
vector with delay 𝑡 ≥ 1 is constructed 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑥1+𝑡, 𝑥2+𝑡, ..., 𝑥𝑚+𝑡.
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(a) Original data (b) IDA (c) Proposed scheme
Figure 13: Recurrence plots for data from Figure 10. x-axis
shows data values, y-axis shows data values with a delay 𝑡 = 1.
A recurrence plot shows the variation between 𝑥 and 𝑥𝑡. In
Figure 13, such plots for a data sample and its fragments
obtained by applying an IDA and the proposed scheme are
shown. Using the proposed scheme, data inside the fragments
are more uniformly distributed.
(a) (b)
Figure 14: Correlation between fragments. Measured for 𝑐 = 2
(a) and 𝑐 = 3 (b). Block size was equal to 34 bytes. Correlation
coefficients are close to 0, even between neighbor fragments.
Correlation. Correlation coefficient was used to evaluate the
linear dependence between data [26]. In Figure 14 correlation
between fragments is shown. The method used for the cal-
culation was same as in [10]. Observed values of correlation
coefficients are close to 0. It demonstrated that even neigh-
bor fragments are not correlated with each other and thus
confirmed the independence property of the scheme.
Difference. Each fragment should be significantly different
from the initial data and from other fragments of the same
fragmentation result. Bit difference between a data sample
and each of its fragments was measured and it was close to
50%. Same result was obtained for the difference between
fragments themselves.
8 COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS AND STORAGE
REQUIREMENTS
Table 1 shows an overview of complexity considerations and
storage requirements of concerned fragmentation schemes
and compares them with the properties of our proposal. Algo-
rithms may be divided into two groups. The first group relies
on symmetric encryption for data protection and combines it
with a key hiding or dispersal method that prevents the key
(and therefore the initial data) recovery until 𝑘 fragments
have been gathered. This group includes all variations of
the all-or-nothing-transform and Secret Sharing Made Short.
Second group, that includes Shamir’s Secret Sharing and
Information Dispersal, is not applying any symmetric key
encryption, but encodes data using a system of equations,
which is incomplete (and therefore harder to solve) when
less than 𝑘 − 1 fragments are present. Such schemes may
be quite fast as the encoding is based on simple operations
(additions and multiplications). However, their big problem is
the lack of scalability when the required number of fragment
𝑘 is growing. It comes from the fact that a growing 𝑘 entails
a growing polynomial degree (SSS) or a growing dimension
of the dispersal matrix (IDA), and in consequence a linear
𝑂
(︀
𝑘
)︀
increase of operations to be performed. Our algorithm
overcomes the scalability issue by introducing the 𝑐 parame-
ter. Data are dispersed over 𝑘 fragments, but encoded using
a polynomial of degree 𝑐. What differentiates it also from the
second group, is the fact that it does not provide availability
at the same time as data protection. If needed, additional
data fragments are obtained using the same 𝑅𝑆 method
than in encryption-based algorithms. The following subsec-
tions give more details about the complexity and storage
requirements of analyzed algorithms. A precise performance
evaluation is hard because of the variety of implementations.
8.1 SSS and IDA
SSS computes 𝑛 values of a polynomial (𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑦) for protecting
a data 𝑑 of size |𝑑|. Thus, its performance depends on the
values of 𝑘, 𝑛, and |𝑑|. Evaluating a polynomial is usually
done using the Horner’s scheme, which is a 𝑂
(︀
𝑘
)︀
operation.
The cost of an IDA equals to the cost of multiplying data 𝑑
by a 𝑘 × 𝑛 dispersal matrix (𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥). In both cases, data
are usually first divided into smaller chunks and processed
in a chunk by chunk fashion. They strongly benefit when the
chunk size is equal to one byte, as it allows an implementation
in finite field arithmetic of the field 𝐺𝐹
(︀
256
)︀
.
8.2 SSMS and AONT-RS
Performance of AONT-RS depends on the chosen encryption
(𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡) and hash algorithms (𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ), as well as on the data
size. If wisely implemented, SSMS applies the same mecha-
nisms than AONT-RS: symmetric encryption (𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡) and
Reed-Solomon (𝑅𝑆) code for redundancy. Instead of hiding
the key inside the hash of the whole data, SSMS disperses it
within the fragments using Shamir’s scheme (𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑦) applied
only on the key. In the case when SSMS is applied on data
much larger than a symmetric key, the time taken by the key
fragmentation is negligible. To produce additional fragments,
both schemes use Reed-Solomon error correction codes (𝑅𝑆).
Performance of 𝑅𝑆 may be slightly improved using Cauchy
Reed-Solomon coding [3].
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Table 1: Runtime and storage requirements of different concerned fragmentation algorithm. 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑦
(︀
𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑑
)︀
: the cost of encoding
data 𝑑 into 𝑛 fragments using a polynomial of degree 𝑘−1.𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥
(︀
𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑑
)︀
: the cost of multiplying data 𝑑 by a dispersal matrix
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥 of dimension 𝑛 × 𝑘. 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡
(︀
𝑑
)︀
: the cost of encoding data using symmetric encryption. 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ: the cost of hashing
the data. 𝑅𝑆: the cost of applying a Reed-Solomon error correction code. 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎
(︀
𝑑, 𝑐, 𝑘
)︀
: the cost of encoding data into
fragments in our proposal. (𝑑 - initial data, |𝑑| - initial data size, 𝑘𝑒𝑦 - symmetric key, |𝑘𝑒𝑦| - symmetric key size, |𝑏| - block size
in our proposal, |𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥| - matrix in IDA, 𝑘 - required number of fragments, 𝑛 - total number of fragments)
Scheme Runtime Runtime Storage Storage
Fragmentation Redundancy Without Redundancy With Redundancy
SSS Poly(n,k,d) - 𝑘|𝑑| 𝑛|𝑑|
IDA Matrix(n,k,d) - |𝑑| + |𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥| 𝑛𝑘 |𝑑| + |𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥|
SSMS Encrypt(d) + Poly(n,k,key) RS(n-k,k,d) |𝑑| + 𝑘|𝑘𝑒𝑦| 𝑛
(︁ |𝑑|
𝑘 + |𝑘𝑒𝑦|
)︁
AONT-RS Encrypt(d) + Hash(d) RS(n-k,k,d) |𝑑| + |𝑘𝑒𝑦| 𝑛𝑘 𝑑 + |𝑘𝑒𝑦|
Our proposal EncodeData(d,c,k) RS(n-k,k,d) |𝑑| + 𝑘|𝑝𝑎| 𝑛𝑘
(︀
|𝑑| + 𝑘|𝑏|
)︀
8.3 Our algorithm
The fragmentation procedure 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎
(︀
𝑐, 𝑘, 𝑑
)︀
is com-
posed of several steps: generating and splitting permutations,
data distribution, data encoding, and data permuting. The
most consuming operation is the mini-blocks encoding. It
takes 𝑐− 1 additions and 𝑐− 1 multiplications to encode a
single mini-block into a mini-share, as the Horner’s scheme
for evaluating a polynomial is used. The procedure is re-
peated for all the mini-blocks inside the data, so at the end
#𝑑#𝑏
(︀
𝑐− 1
)︀
additions and same number of multiplications
are needed to encode the whole data. Because a 𝐺𝐹
(︀
256
)︀
finite field is used (like for SSS and IDA), a lookup table
is used to replace the multiplications and the additions are
implemented as a xor. Permuting a mini-share inside a share
may be implemented as a constant time operation. Data
dispersal function FormFragments is an 𝑂
(︀
𝑘
)︀
operation.
Permutations generation may be implemented in various
ways and depends on the size |𝑝𝑎|. Permutations splitting
depends on the size of |𝑝𝑎| and the value of 𝑐. Being very
simple and applied only once, data dispersal and permuta-
tions generation and splitting have a negligible effect on the
algorithm performance. Additional fragments (if needed) are
generated inside an optional procedure 𝑅𝑆, which is exactly
the same as the one used for SSMS and AONT-RS. The
procedure results in a 𝑘|𝑝𝑎| storage overhead (when 𝑅𝑆 is
not applied). A larger data block increases this overhead, but
at the same time improves data protection and performance,
as it allows a better parallelization of encoding. Once the
permutations are recovered, the defragmentation procedure
is fully parallelizable, as a share may be decoded without
waiting for the previous block to be processed.
9 MEASURED PERFORMANCE
We benchmarked the proposed algorithm against the state-of-
the art fragmentation techniques presented in Section 3. All
schemes were implemented in JAVA using following resources:
JDK 1.8 on DELL Latitude E6540, X64-based PC running
on Intel® CoreTM i7-4800MQ CPU @ 2.70 GHz with 8 GB
RAM, under Windows 7. The standard 𝑗𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑥.𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑜 library
was used to implement cryptographic mechanisms. For each
algorithm, the throughput was measured in an identical way
on random data samples of 100MB.
9.1 Implementation details
Similarly to Shamir’s scheme, the proposed algorithm can
be implemented in any Galois Field 𝐺𝐹
(︀
2𝑄
)︀
. 𝑄 is usually
selected according to the word size of processors and can be
8, 16, 32 or 64-bit. The presented version was implemented
in 𝐺𝐹
(︀
28
)︀
, which allows the use of only logical operations.
Same field was used for the implementations of IDA and
SSS. AONT-RS was implemented in two versions: fast and
secure. The fast version uses a combination of RC4 and MD5,
the secure version is based on AES and SHA-256. Similarly,
SSMS was implemented in two versions: one using RC4 and
second using AES, and SSS was applied for key protection.
For larger data the cost of splitting the key was negligible.
We are aware that RC4 is an obsolete way of protecting data.
However, it was used in the implementation of the original
fast AONT-RS [24] and makes a good reference point for the
speed comparison. The AES was used in the CTR mode with
a 128 bits key and the AES-NI instruction set was enabled
during the run.
9.2 Results
The fragmentation throughput was measured for six different
configurations of our scheme: for two different values of 𝑐
(2 and 3) and three different choices of the block’s size (16,
34, and 250 bytes). (A block size of 16 bytes was chosen as
it produces the same storage overhead than SSMS with a
128-bits key. A block size of 34 bytes makes the recovery
of a permutation array similar to performing a brute-force
attack on a 128-bits key. A block size of 250 optimizes the
performance of the scheme.) Figure 15 and 16 show the
results of the comparison with relevant works. Our scheme
is up to 50% (𝑐 = 2) or 40% (𝑐 = 3) faster than the fastest
(SSMS with RC4) of the relevant works. It is more than 60%
(𝑐 = 2) and 40%(𝑐 = 3) faster in comparison to SSMS with
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AES. The cost of AONT-RS is higher than the cost of SSMS
(as hashing data is more costly than splitting the key). In
contrary to rest of the algorithms, IDA and SSS do not scale
with the number of fragments 𝑘.
As presented in Figure 17, the chosen size of the block has
an impact on the speed of our proposal. the fragmentation
throughput grows with the the block size until achieving a
maximum around 200-250 bytes. A block size of around 10
bytes (𝑐 = 2) or 20 bytes (𝑐 = 3) is enough to achieve the
same performance as the two fastest of the relevant works (see
Figure 17b). For a higher throughput of the fragmentation
(and a better data protection level) a block size of more than
200 bytes is recommended.
Figure 15: Performance benchmark, 𝑐 = 2.
10 FUTURE WORKS
In the future, we plan to perform a deeper cryptanalysis of
our algorithm to precisely position its level of data protection.
We also consider to implement a new version of the algorithm
that would exploit the possibility of parallelization of the
processing due to fragmentation . Moreover, the described
fragmentation algorithm could be seen as a particular case of
a more general method for data protection mixing fragmenta-
tion, data encoding, and data dispersal. Modifications in the
way of data dispersal over fragment, data encoding, or data
permuting could be done. For instance, data permutations
can be done in a more complex and less regular way adding
security (but probably loosing performance and capability
of parallelization). As a second instance, in a pre-processing
step data (i.e. like in [21]) could be first shred into two parts
- a confidential and a non-confidential one - and then frag-
mented. It would generate fragments of different importance
Figure 16: Performance benchmark, 𝑐 = 3.
(a) (b)
Figure 17: Performance in function of the block size for 𝑐 = 2
and 𝑐 = 3 (a). A block size of 30 bytes allows the scheme to
be faster than the relevant work (b)
that could be dispersed in a selective manner over site with
different levels of trustworthiness and cost. A different sharing
scheme could be also applied for the data encoding. Last, but
not least, the scheme could be adapted for different and more
elaborated use cases, for instance involving several users. In-
deed, fragmentation techniques are particularly well adapted
to the nature of a multi-cloud environment, but they are also
seen as an alternative to onion routing [14] or as a key-less
way of data protection in sensor networks.
11 CONCLUSION
A novel algorithm for protecting data through fragmenta-
tion, encoding, and dispersal was introduced and analyzed.
Data transformation into fragments relies on a combination
of secret sharing and data permuting. During this process
dependencies are created between data inside the fragments,
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in such a way that full data recovery is possible only when
all fragments have been gathered, which is possible only by
acquiring the location and the different access rights of 𝑐 in-
dependent storage providers. First performance benchmarks
show that the scheme is up to twice time faster than the
state-of-the art comparable and widely renown techniques,
while producing a reasonable storage overhead. Empirical
security analysis verified that data inside the produced frag-
ments do not preserve patterns and is therefore resistant
to statistical analysis. The proposed scheme is particularly
well adapted for data dispersal in a multi-cloud environment,
where non-colluding cloud providers ensure the physical sep-
aration between the fragments. A method for an optimal
secure dispersal of produced fragments between the clouds
was presented. The scheme architecture is flexible, so it is
possible to balance between desired performance, level of
data protection, and storage overhead.
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